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THE RULES OF EVIDENCE-AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW*
STEUART HENDERSON BRiTT

Our law reviews are filled with what we as lawyers think about everything
from bailments to bailiwicks, from problems of hearsay to problems of
homicide.
"The time has come," the Lawyer said,
"To talk of trusts and torts;
Of shares-and stocks-and secret trustsOf carriers-and courtsAnd why a judge gets boiling hotAnd whether rules are things."
Yes, the time has come to talk, but the time has also come to know certain
things about the law, especially that much maligned body of law known as
the rules of evidence. As Professors Morgan and Maguire say:
"The time has come to make a searching inquiry into the policy of
preserving the recognized privileges, and to subject the orthodox assumptions and assertions by which they are ordinarily justified to an
impartial analysis. The rule excluding opinion evidence continues to be
a source of needless litigatiofi in the appellate courts, and to have no
foundation in common or uncommon sense. The worst features of the
adversary system continue to show themselves in the rules concerning
the impeachment of witnesses. In short there is scarcely a segment of
the subject which does not call for re-examination and revision."'
The day of theorizing is by no means over. But in the law today we also
demand facts to which theories may be practically applied. Rules of evidence for any hearing should be designed to supply facts, whether that
hearing is before a "court" or a "commission."
Recently we have been made more and more aware of the significance of
administrative law. In fact, the rise of administrative law and of administrative agencies has been one of the most important developments of our
time. 2 So much has this been the case that the question raised in the 1938
*This research was begun in 1935 while the writer was receiving support from a grant
by the Carnegie Corporation. The encouragement of Professor Edward L. Thorndike
of Columbia University Teachers College is gratefully acknowledged. Special thanks
are due to Professor Frank M. Weida of The George Washington University for his
many helpful suggestions concerning the statistical treatment of the data. Finally, appreciation is hereby expressed to every one of those 136 persons who gave his time so
generously in evaluating the rules of evidence used in this study.
'Morgan and Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence (1937) 50 HARV.
L. REv. 909, 922.
'This has recently been emphasized by Dean Landis-Bell, Landis Guides Young
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essay contest of the American Bar Association was: to what extent should
fact-finding boards be bound by rules of evidence? This question raises in
turn a series of other questions. How has administrative law been influenced
by the rules of evidence which make up our civil and criminal law? Should
these rules of evidence be incorporated wholesale -into administrative law?
Or some of them only? Or none at all? Should our various commissions
and fact-finding boards be bound by the time-honored rules, or be free to
follow their own ideas concerning the evaluation of evidence? The applicability of the common-aw rules to proceedings of administrative tribunals has
3
been carefully considered by various writers.
However, before prognosticating as to the usefulness of evidence rules
before administrative tribunals, it would seem desirable, first of all, to determine the extent to which certain rules should be used in court proceedings.
How has civil and criminal law been influenced by the rules of evidence?
Should all these rules of evidence be continued in use? Or some of them
only? Or none at all? Should our various courts be more bound by the timehonored rules, or more free of them?
Lawyers may have real difficulty in examining such questions objectively.
It is much easier simply to favor the use of those evidence rules which apparently help to win verdicts and/or judgments. Thus a practicing lawyer
may remember fondly a case that he had last month in which loose interpretation of the rules of evidence aided the court in giving a judgment-in his
favor. Another lawyer may recall another case in which stricter application
of the rules of evidence was a real help-to his client.
Such mulling over of cases in retrospect is interesting, but where does it
lead? It usually leads into wordy arguments and discussions of points of
view. We may spend so much energy in "battles of -words" that no one
thinks of the possibilities of experimentation. Almost no one thinks of an
empirical4 approach to the problem. We as lawyers often'spend a disLawyers to New Fields, N. Y. Times Magazine, Nov. 28, 1937, p. 11. The Interstate
Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange

Commission, the National Labor Relations Board-such organizations have had a mushroom
growth.
3
Ross, Applicability of Common Law Rules of Evidence in Proceedings before Workmen's Compensation Commissions (1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 263. STEPHENs, ADMIN-

ISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE, A STUDY IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw (1935) 93 says "that it is thought that the problems to be solved

by administrative tribunals are so different from those commonly confronting courts that
methods unknown to the courts must be followed, and that application of the rules of
evidence would gravely limit, if not frustrate, the commission's work. . .

."

Stephan,

The Extent to Which Fact-Finding Boards Should Be Bound by Rules of Evidence

(1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 630 (the paper which received the award in the 1938 essay contest of the American Bar Association). Seymour, The Professor Soliloquizes on FactFinding Boards and the Rules of Evidence (1938) 24 A. B. A. J.891.
"'Empirical=l. pert. to experience; 2. pert. to methods or conclusions based on
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proportionate amount of time discussing exact definitions and points of view.
Of course, this is not new to us as a group. Law has always consisted of
a good deal of arm-chair philosophizing. But is not the time now ripe for
investigations which are more empirical?5 Profitable though our talk-fests
may be, it seems high time that we made use of the empirical method in
studying the rules of evidence. Let us be done temporarily with arm-chair
philosophizing !
II
With such a philosophy, the writer made an empirical attack on the present
problem. As he is a member of the bar who formerly practiced law, he
believed that an empirical study of the rules of evidence should necessarily
involve an investigation of the views of practicing lawyers, of law professors,
and of evidence "experts." As the writer is also a psychologist now specializing in the field of legal psychology, he believed that such a study should
also involve an investigation of the views of psychologists who are not dealing with legal problems. Psychologists, being outside the field of law, might
be more objective about the rules of evidence than lawyers, and might have
information of particular value on some of the rules which involve not only
legal but psychological problems.
From the entire body of principles and definitions known as the "rules of
evidence," 154 rules were selected for intensive statistical study. These 154
rules were intended to be a sampling of the rules of all sorts of categoriesadmissibility, circumstantial evidence, testimonial qualifications, documentary
evidence, testimonial privilege, etc. These 154 rules were selected by careful
analysis from the 3,150 rules in Wigmore's Code of Evidence.6 Forty-three
of the rules were selected because an adequate evaluation of them calls for
some type of psychological judgment. Rule 61 is an example of such a rule:
TESTIMONIAL QUALIFICATIONS:
TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEDGE (OBSERVATION):

Sanity. A witness to sanity or the reverse is qualified who has had
sufficient observation of the person to form a belief as to his mental
condition.
Dean'Wigmore's typographical marks indicate every rule which "is the law
observation or experiment. [Syn. (1) experiential. Contr. (2) w. deductive and
rational,whether as a term of reproach (i.e. lacking necessary theorizing), or as a term
of praise (i.e. avoiding rigorously all hypothesis except working hypotheses).]" WARREN (ed.), DIcTIoNARY OF PSYCHaOLOGY (1934) 92.

5
"The empirical method may be characterized by three important techniques: the
experimental method; the use of first-hand observation; and the employment of statistics." Britt, Past and Present Trends in the Methods and Subject Matter of Social
Pschology (1937)

15 SocIAL FORCES 462, 464.

6WiGmORE, CODE ON THE RULES OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS OF LAv (2d ed. 1935).
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iii some jurisdictions, but not in all" ;7 rules thus marked were not included
in the present study. Dean Wigmore's typographical marks, plus footnotes,
also indicate those rules which are the law in every jurisdiction but which in
his opinion "ought not ta be law" ;s 22 such rules were included in the 154.
An independent evaluation by the writer, both as a lawyer and as a psychologist, revealed 21 additional rules which he believed to be "bad" or "probably bad." This made a total of 43 (28%) of the 154 rules which were
considered to be of questionable value.
It should be clear, however, that the evaluations by Wigmore and by the
writer needed to be checked empirically.
Therefore, four different groups were selected to give their judgments
on the 154 rules: Group I, 34 Evidence Experts (professors of Evidence).
Group II, 34 Law Professors who do not teach Evidence. Group III, 34
Practicing Lawyers. Group IV, 34 Psychologists. This was a total of 136
persons.
GRoup I (referred to hereafter as "Evidence Experts"). Professors of
Evidence were chosen as representing experts on the rules of evidence.
An expert is "one qualified by study or experience, or both, to understand
and explain the subject under consideration; a person who has technical
and peculiar knowledge in relation to matters with which the mass of mankind are supposed not to be acquainted." In order to secure only those who
could thus qualify as experts on the subject of Evidence, the following
criteria were adopted for inclusion in this group: (a) professors of Evidence, (b) teaching in law schools which belong to the Association of American Law Schools, (c) who had taught Evidence for over five years. The
Directory of Teachers in Member Schools of the Association for 1935, and
for 1936-37, 9' yielded the names of 62 professors of Evidence who had
taught Evidence for over five years. Of these 62, it was found that three
were deceased. An additional 18 were not considered in the present study
because they were apparently engaged in law practice as well as in teaching
Evidence in a law school. They were eliminated from consideration in order
to prevent confusion between Group I (Evidence Experts) and Group III
(Practicing Lawyers). This meant that there were only 42 "experts" on
Evidence in the entire country who could meet the criteria adopted for inclusion in Group I.
Judgments were received by mail from 34 of the 42. This is a remarkably
"id.at xv.

'Id. at xv.

'25 C. J. 176.
'Published by West Publishing Co.
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high percentage of returns in any questionnaire study. It represents 80%
of the total number 110
GROUP II (referred to hereafter as "Law Professors"). Law Professors
who do not teach Evidence were also chosen from the Directory of Teachers
in Member Schools of the Association of American Law Schools. Just as
with Group I, this group of professors was widely scattered. It included
teachers in the law schools of Chicago, Colorado, Columbia, Denver, George
Wbashington, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana State, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Ohio State, Temple, Washington (Seattle), Washington (St. Louis), and
Yale. These 34 men were experts in such diversified branches of the law
as contracts, constitutional law, criminal law, property, etc., and were thus
primarily concerned with the rules of evidence only as they pertained to their
own special fields.
GROUP III ("Practicing Lawyers"). Practicing Lawyers were chosen in
such a way as to give a wide sampling as to age, income, and amount of trial
practice. To this end 34 friends of the writer were selected from the bars
of the three jurisdictions of which he is a member: Missouri, New York, and
the District of Columbia.
GROUP IV ("Psychologists"). Psychologists were chosen from the 1936
and the 1937 Year Book of the American Psychological Association.10' All
34 bad Doctor's degrees in psychology. They were widely scattered, both
geographically and as to fields of specialization. Although psychologists 'ordinarily lack legal training, and so are not in a position to make legalistic
judgments on a great many of the rules of evidence, there are certain rules
where a psychological analysis is especially desirable. On many of the 154
rules, judgments of psychologists might introduce valuable extra-legal considerations which might escape the notice of persons with non-psychological
training.
Seventeen sets of 154 identical rules were typed on separate slips of thin
paper 3 2 by 81/ inches. Each rule was a quotation from Wigmore's Code
of Evidence, although this was not indicated. In fact, the only mark of
identification on any slip was a number from 1 to 154. Thus, the first rule
was:
1

Weight of Evidence; Credibility of Witnesses; Judge's Comments.
The judge may not express to the jury, after the close of evidence
and argument, his personal opinio%as to the credibility or weight of the
evidence or any part thereof.
'Many a publication utilizing data from a mailed questionnaire is based on a return
of less than 40%.
'*Published by The American Psychological Association, Inc.
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A set of the 154 rules was mailed to each of the 34 persons in each of the
four groups, making a total of 136 persons. The following instructions
were enclosed:
Write your name here ................
Your name will not be used in this study.
The above is simply for identification.
INSTRUCTIONS AS TO RULES OF EVIDENCE
On these slips you will find 154 separate rules of evidence. Please
mark on the lower bottom edge your judgment of each rule, according
to the following plan:
+2
+1

Good
Probably good

=
=

-1

Doubtful whether good or bad
- Probably bad

-2

=

0

=

Bad

In doing this, simply read each rule in turn and mark it; in case of
doubt, pass on to the next rule and come back later to any not marked.
As to the criterion of good and bad, use any that fits in with your ideas
of the general field of Evidence.
Please do not refer to any secondary sources, but give your own
opinion in each case.
Put your numbers on the extreme lower bottom edge, so that these
numbers may later be clipped off, and the rules submitted to someone
else for judging. Do not add any other marks or writing to these slips;
if you have comments to make on any particular rule, please write these
on a separate sheet of paper and return herewith.
Just as soon as the judgments were received from any of the 136 individuals who participated, his numerical judgments were copied onto a master
sheet, and his markings were clipped off the bottom edge of each slip. The
entire set of rules and instructions were then mailed to another person for
judging.
In several of the rules, e.g., Rule 56 infra, there was more than one part
to the rule. This raised the question in the minds of some judges of how
to rate the rule adequately in only one answer. Where this question was
specifically raised, the rater was told simply to note down his general impression of the rule in its entirety; that is, considering the rule as a whole,
what numerical rating would he give it?"1 In a number of instances, how"The only exceptions to considering the rule as a whole were in the case of Rules
114 and 123, where the instructions typed at the heading read, "Consider (d) only,"
and "Consider (3) only."
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ever, a judge would mark the various parts of a rule separately. In these
cases the present investigator struck an average of the ratings of the separate
parts of the rule, and then gave the rule the corresponding numerical rating
as being the rating of that judge.
III
Naturally the criteria of "goodness" and "badness" varied between the
groups, and even between members of the same group. Some of the standards
employed, according to some participants, were knowledge of legal usage;
knowledge of legal abuses; social feasibility; logical considerations; ethical
considerations; psychological interpretations.
However, a statistical treatment of the data revealed a surprisingly high
consistency between members of the same group. For the 34 Evidence Ex=
perts, a coefficient of correlation (a measure of agreement) was determined
between the judgments of the half whose replies were received in the order
1, 3, 5, ... 33, and between the other half whose replies were received in
the order 2, 4, 6, . . . 34. Such a selection is a random selection for the
purpose of determining consistency. Coefficients of correlation were likewise
determined between the 17 "odd-numbered" Law Professors (who do not
teach Evidence) and the 17 "even-numbered" Law Professors (who do not
teach Evidence) ; likewise between the two halves of the group of Practicing
Lawyers; and also in a similar manner between the two halves of the Psychologists.
The correlation coefficients were: ±.95 for Evidence Experts; ±.94 for
2
Law Professors; ±.90 for Practicing Lawyers; ±.95 for Psychologists.'
The formula for the coefficient of correlation is written in such a way that
+1.00 means perfect positive correlation, that 0.00 means no correlation at
all, and that -1.00 means perfect inverse correlation.
Therefore, the above correlations indicate an extremely high degree of
consistency between the judgments of the members of each group and other
members of that same group. (In each case the probable error was .01;
this means that it is as likely as not that the true correlation coefficient
differs from the one found as much as .01.) In other words, each one of the
groups is in close agreement among its own members. Apparently the ideas
of the members of a particular group are much the same as to the "goodness"
or "badness" of the respective items.
"The original correlation coefficients of the two halves of each group were: +.91 for
Evidence Experts; +.89

for Psychologists.

for Law Professors;

+.82

for Practicing Lawyers; +.90

These were "stepped up" to +.95, +.94, +.90, and +.95 respectively

by the Spearman-Brown formula. Gaar,
(2d ed. 1937) 318-319.

STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION
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IV
The next question was: to what extent do the judgments of the other three
groups agree with the judgments of the Evidence Experts? The coefficient
of correlation between the judgments of the Evidence Experts and those of
the Law Professors who do not teach Evidence was ±.94 (±01).13 This
indicates a very high degree of agreement between these groups on the 154
rules as a whole.
The measure of agreement between the judgments of the Evidence Experts and of the Practicing Lawyers was considerably less but still quite
significant. It was ±.75 (±.02). This indicates a rather high agreement
between the two groups, but shows that they probably differ intheir 'standards
of judgment on a number of the rules.
The coefficient of correlation between judgments of Evidence Experts and
of Psychologists was only +.62 (-.03). This indicates a positive relation
between their judgments of the rules, but also suggests lack "of agreement
on a substantial number.
Also, the coefficients of correlation between judgments of Law Professors
and of Practicing Lawyers was +.75 (-L.02) ; between judgments of Law
Professors and of Psychologists was +..76 (±L.02) ; and between judgments
of Practicing Lawyers and of Psychologists was +.70 (!.03).
The total relationships obtained are presented in Table I.
TABLE I
COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN THE JUDGMENTS OF EVIDENCE EXPERTS,

LAW PROFESSORS, PRACTICING LAWYERS, AND PSYCHOLOGISTS ON THE

154 RULES OF EVIDENCE

Evidence

Evidence Experts

Law Professors
Practicing Lawyers

Experts
+.95 ±.01

Law

Professors
+.94

L.01

+.94 ±..01

Practicing

Lawyers

Psychologists

+.75 i.02
+.75 ±.02
+.90 t.01

Psychologists

+.6Z

t.03

+.95

±.01

+.76 ±.02
+.70 -. 03

The internal coefficients of correlation are printed in bold face type in order
to emphasize the great amount of agreement within each group of the judgments of the members composing that group.
'The coefficient of correlation was determined by the special formula:
. YULE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORY
Tv
xyVzI2
'-/Xl-2

OF STATISTICS

YV
1 12

(8th ed. rev. 1927) 213. The same formula was used for the remaining coefficients of
correlation between different groups.
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V
That the groups were not judging the rules on the same basis was found
by computing the critical ratios for the coefficients of correlation. "Critical
ratio" is a statistical measure of the relation between a magnitude (a difference between two numbers) and its standard deviation. A critical ratio must
be at least 2.0 to be considered even somewhat significant. Any critical ratio
between 2.0 and 3.0 is of some significance statistically, while a critical ratio
over 3.0 indicates that the difference in results is of genuine statistical significance, that is, due to factors other than chance.
In the present study, critical ratios were computed for the difference between the correlation coefficient of the judgments of each group with the
judgments of the Evidence Experts, and the correlation coefficient of the
judgments of each of the other two groups with the judgments of the Evidence Experts. The critical ratios found were: 4.8 for Law Professors as
compared with Practicing Lawyers ;14 6.4 for Law Professors as compared
with Psychologists ;15 and 2.2 for Practicing Lawyers as compared with
Psychologists.1" Therefore, these ratios indicated that the differences in the
judgments of the groups were very reliable statistically.
VI
The judgments of any one person on any one rule could be +2, +1, 0,
-1, or -2; and there were 34 individuals in each group. Therefore, it was
theoretically possible for the judgments of any one group on any one rule to
vary from as high as +68 to as low as -68. Actually they varied only from
+68 to -40.
Inspection of the judgments of each group revealed that the judgments of
the Evidence Experts varied from as high as ±67 to as low as -40. The
range of the judgments of the other three groups were: Law Professors,
from +68 to -28; Practicing Lawyers, from +68 to -31; Psychologists,
from +67 to -39.
These figures do not suggest any great amount of
difference between the four groups in terms of the numerical degree of their
"best" and "worst" judgments.
14
This shows that the degree of linear relation between the judgments of the Evidence
Experts and those of the Law Professors is sufficiently greater than the degree of
linear relation between the judgments of the Evidence Experts and those of the Practicing Lawyers to be attributable to factors other than chance.
'This shows that the degree of linear relation between the judgments of the Evidence
Experts and those of the Law Professors is sufficiently greater than the degree of linear
relation between the judgments of the Evidence Experts and those of the Psychologists
to be
attributable to factors other than chance.
"6This shows that the degree of linear relation between the judgments of the Evidence
Experts and those of the Practicing Lawyers is sufficiently greater than the degree of
linear relation between the judgments of the Evidence Experts and those of the Psychologists to be attributable probably to factors other than chance.
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Much more important is the question: what were the arithmetic means
(averages) of the four groups on the entire 154 rules? Evidence Experts,
for example, might have a tendency to rate the majority of the rules as "good"
or "probably gobd," as compared with, say, Practicing Lawyers, who might
tend to put in more "bad" or "probably bad" judgments. Accordingly, the
arithmetic mean (average) of the judgments was calculated for each of the
four groups. The mean of the judgment scores on all 154 rules was highest
for the Practicing Lawyers, lowest for the Psychologists: +39.0 (±16.1)
for the Evidence Experts; +35.9 (--15.6) for the Law Professors; +42.0
(±12.3) for the Practicing Lawyers; and +25.0 (±15.2) for the Psychologists.
The above ranges in judgments, and the above means, reveal the general
tendency of each of the four groups to judge the rules as fairly good. It is
quite true that such a result may be due in part to the fact that the investigator chose only 43 (28%) of the 154 rules as bad or probably bad. However, it must be said that the writer had real difficulty in finding "bad" rules
as compared with the tremendous number of "good" rules. Several letters
written by judges at the time they returned their sets of rules contained
specific comments as to the general "goodness" of most of the iules. Even
with the many "bad" rules purposely inserted in the 154, many of the judges
mentioned how sensible most of the rules of evidence are. This was of
particular interest in the case of the Psychologists, many of whom were
previously inclined to be critical of the whole field of law, but who were
now agreeably surprised to find themselves in essential agreement with a large
number of the rules.
VII
Since the arithmetic mean of the judgments of the Evidence Experts was
+39.0, of the Law Professors +35.9, of the Practicing Lawyers +42.0,
and of the Psychologists +25.0, the next question is: how significant statistically were the differences between these arithmetic means? In order to
answer this question, critical ratios were determined for the arithmetic mean
of each one of the other three groups as compared with the arithmetic mean
-of the group of Evidence Experts. As an example, the critical ratio was
computed for the +35.9 mean of the Law Professors as compared with the
+39.0 mean of the Evidence Experts.
A critical ratio of only 1.3 showed that the difference in the total judgments of the Evidence Experts and of the Law Professors was not statistically significant. Neither did a criticalratio of only 1.1 indicate a significant
-difference statistically between the total judgments of the Evidence Experts

566
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and those of the Practicing Lawyers. However, a critical ratio of 5.3 between
the arithmetic mean of the judgments of the Evidence Experts and of thePsychologists was very significant statistically; that is, the difference be-tween these two means was due to factors other than chance.
A coefficient of variability (a measure of homogeneity) was also computed for each group.' 7 In this way each of the other three groups was compared with the Evidence Experts as to degree of variability of judgments.
The coefficient of variability for Evidence Experts was 61.4%; for Law
Professors, 64.4%; for Practicing Lawyers, 43.3%; for Psychologists,
89.8%. In other words, the Evidence Experts and the Law Professors
tended to have about the same degree of variability in their judgments of
the entire set of rules. Practicing Lawyers, on the other hand, tended as a
group to concentrate their numerical ratings at about the same level of "goodness." The Psychologists were more variable than the other groups in that
they rated many rules on the "good" side and many on the "bad" side:

VIII
A complete statistical analysis was next made of the judgments on eachane of the separate 154 rules by the group of 34 Evidence Experts. That is,
the 17 "odd-numbered" Evidence Experts were again matched with 'the 17
"even-numbered" ones, and the critical ratio was determined for each oneof the 154 rules. Not a single rule showed a critical ratio as high as 3.03 s
This means that statistically significant differences were not .found'
between the two halves of the group of experts. Here was an additional
check on the internal correlation coefficient of +.95, supra, of Evidence
Experts, which had indicated high consistency in their judgments. The idea
was thus validated that the Evidence Experts agreed remarkably well amongthemselves as to the desirability or undesirability of particular rules.

Ix
An analysis was now made of each one of the 154 rules. This required the statistical computation of 462 different critical ratios (154 for
each of the three groups as compared with the Evidence Experts).
Critical ratios were computed for each one of the 154 rules separately,
comparing the mean judgments of the Evidence Experts on each rule with
those of the Law Professors. Similarly, 154 critical ratios were computed
"The coefficient of variability is the standard deviation expressed as a percentage of
the arithmetic mean.
"Rules 32, 98, and 142 did have critical ratios as high as 2.1, 2.0, and 2.1 respectively.
These were the highest critical ratios. The critical ratios of the other 151 rules were

less than 2.0.
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-for the mean judgments of the Evidence Experts on each rule as compared
-with the mean judgments of the Practicing Lawyers. Likewise, 154 critical
ratios were determined by comparing the mean judgments of the Evidence
Experts on each rule with those of the Psychologists.
In a great many instances all four groups were in fairly close agreement
that the particular rule was "good" or "bad." In many such cases, the
,critical ratios were not statistically significant, indicating that the small
differences in judgments between the groups were simply due to chance
factors.
On many rules, however, significant statistical differences were found (1)
'between the judgments of the Evidence Experts and those of the Law Professors; (2) in other instances, between Evidence Experts and Practicing
Lawyers; and (3) in still others, between Evidence Experts and Psy•chologists. Where such a statistically reliable difference occurred between the
judgments of two groups about a particular rule, it meant that the difference
-between the judgments of the two groups was due to factors other than
,chance. In other words, there was a genuine basis for the difference in rating
between the two groups.
This can best be illustrated by presenting a sample of the results. Following are Rules 54 to 58 inclusive, all concerned with testimonial qualifications:
54

TESTIMONIAL QUALIFICATIONS:
ORGANIC CAPACITY:
MENTAL IMMATURITY (INFANCY):

A person under the age of fourteen is presumed to lack
capacity.
55

TESTIMONIAL QUALIFICATIONS:
ORGANIC CAPACITY:
MORAL CAPACITY:

Alierage, Race, Color, Sex, Religion. A person is not disqualified by reason of birthplace, race, color, sex, or theological or
religious profession or belief.
56

TESTIMONIAL QUALIFICATIONS:
EXPERIENTIAL CAPACITY:

For medical topics (health, sanity, poison, blood, etc.):
(1) General experience qualifies to testify to apparent
conditions.

(2) Where special medical experience is needed, a general
practitioner in good standing suffices for all subjects included in
ordinary medical training.
57

TESTIMONIAL QUALIFICATIONS:
EXPERIENTIAL CAPACITY:

For handwriting in general, any person able to read and write
is qualified.
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58

TESTIMONIAL QUALIFICATIONS:
EMOTIONAL CAPACITY:
PECUNIARY INTEREST:

Criminal Cases. No person in a criminal case is disqualified
by reason. of being a party, or of having any other interest depending on the event of the trial or on the action of prosecuting officers.
As has previously been pointed out, the theoretical range of judgment
scores of any one group on any one rule is from as high as +68 to as low as
-68. The actual extremes were from +68 to -40. The judgment scores
of the four groups on Rules 54 to 58 are shown in Table II.
How should we interpret the results shown in Table II?
The mere fact that the numerical judgments of a particular group differ
considerably from the judgments of the Evidence Experts on a particular
rule does not necessarily mean that the difference is statistically significant.
Note, for example, that on Rule 57 the difference between -7 (Evidence
Experts) and -21
(Psychologists) is 14 points. The difference is not
statistically significant, however, for the critical ratio was only 1.2. On the
other hand, in Rule 58 the difference between +64 (Evidence Experts) and
+50 (Practicing Lawyers) is likewise 14 points. The difference here is of
much greater statistical significance, for the critical ratio was 2.3.
Also, simply because a numerical judgment has a "+" sign before it does
not prove that the rule is considered unusually good. Note that the mean
judgment scores on all 154 rules are given at the top of the column for each
group. The score of any particular group on any one rule should not only
be compared (horizontally) with the judgments 6f the other three groups on
that rule, but should also be compared (vertically) with the mean score for
the entire 154 rules of that particular group.
For example, Rule 58 is rated +64 by the Evidence Experts, +41 by the
Law Professors, +50 by the Practicing Lawyers, and ±10 by the Psychologists. It is obvious that none of the other three groups thinks so well of the
Rule as do the Evidence Experts. The single parentheses ( ) show that the
slightly lower rating by the Practicing Lawyers than by the Evidence Experts
is of some statistical significance, while the double parentheses (( )) indicate that the still lower judgments of the Law Professors and of the Psychologists (as compared with the judgments of the Evidence Experts) are of
real statistical significance, i.e., due to factors other than chance.
Now, when these scores of each group on Rule 58 are compared with the
mean scores on all the rides, the following facts are also clear: the +64
rating of the Evidence Experts is very high. Athough the +50 rating of the
Practicing Lawyers is a bit lower than the rating of the Evidence Experts
and probably because of factors other than chance, still this +50 is above the
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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
mean score (+42.0) of Practicing Lawyers for all the rules; hence, the
Practicing Lawyers think this to be a fairly good rule. Although the +41
rating of the Law Professors is still lower and is certainly statistically significant as compared with the +64 rating of the Evidence Experts, still this
+41 is somewhat above the mean score (+35.9) of Law Professors for all
the rules; hence, the Law Professors apparently think this rule to be fairly
good. However, the +10 rating of the Psychologists is not only very low as
compared with the ratings of any of the other three groups, and the difference between their rating and that of the Evidence Experts is of genuine
statistical significance, but this +10 rating is also low as compared with the
mean score (+25.0) of Psychologists for all the rules; hence, the Psychologists (despite the phis sign) think this rule is not very good.
The five rules can easily be summarized in terms of the judgments and a
recommendation for each one:
RULE 54. That a person under the age of fourteen is presumed to lack
capacity to testify was considered a bad rule by both Wigmore and the present
investigator. Both the Evidence Experts and the Psychologists also believe
this is a very bad rule. The Law Professors likewise regard it as a bad rule,
but not to so great an extent, and the difference between their judgments.
and those of the Evidence Experts is of some significance statistically. The
Practicing Lawyers, on the other hand, differ from the Evidence Experts for
reasons not due to chance in not considering the rule nearly so bad as do.
the Evidence Experts; but the Practicing Lawyers, as compared with their
mean score on all the rules, give this rule a very low rating. Recom-mendation: This rule should be carefully studied from the standpoint of the law
practitioner, and should probably be discarded.
RULE 55. All groups agree that this is a good rule and give it practically
a top rating. Only the Psychologists, apparently due to factors other than
chance as compared with the Evidence Experts, give it a slightly lower rating
than the other groups; but the Psychologists tend to rate all the rules lower
than the other groups. Recommendation: This rule should be continued in
use.
RULE 56. The writer believed this rule to be bad. The Evidence Experts
rate this rule slightly above their mean judgment score. Both the Law Professors and the Practicing Lawyers rate it below their respective mean scores.
The Psychologists, because of factors other than chance as compared with
the Evidence Experts, consider the rule of very doubtful value. Recomnmnevdation: This rule should be studied psychologically. The fact that it receives only a reasonably high rating by the Evidence Experts, and a rather
low rating by Law Professors and Practicing Lawyers, coupled with the
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fact that the Psychologists see reasons for questioning it, suggest that the
rule might well be submitted to psychologists for reasons for their much
lower judgments than the other groups.
RULE 57. The writer believed this rule to be a bad one. All the four
groups agree with him that it is. Since there are no statistically reliable
differences between the groups, the rule should not be used. Recommendation: The rule should be definitely discarded.
RuLE 58. Here there is considerable disagreement. The Evidence Experts consider this rule very good, the Practicing Lawyers rather good, the
Law Professors probably good, and the Psychologists of doubtful value. The
critical ratios of all three of these last groups, as compared with the Evidence
Experts, indicate that there are reasons other than chance for their not liking
the rule in its present form as much as do the Evidence Experts: Recommendation: This rule should be carefully analyzed, with a view to revision.
A similar analysis could be presented here for each one of the 154 rules
studied. This sample should be sufficient, however, to indicate the value of
the method to everyone concerned with the law of Evidence.aa
X
As was indicated above, 43 of the 154 rules were selected by the writer
because some type of psychological judgment is required in order to make an
adequate analysis. The judgments, espedially of the Psychologists, on certain
of these deserve special comment:
15

In an action involving the conduct of an animal, the animal's
character as to the appropriate trait is admissible as evidence of its
probable conduct.

It would seem reasonable to suppose that psychologists, who have worked
with animals in the laboratory, might have additional information on this
problem not possessed by lawyers. Although the score of the Psychologists
on this rule is higher than their mean score on the entire 154 rules, yet their
score on this rule is much lower than the high judgment score of the Evidence Experts, and because of factors other than chance.
16

Whenever the doing or not doing of a human act by a person is
material to be proved, his possession or lack of suitable corporal or
mental capacity, or technical skill, or mechanical means or tools, is
relevant and admissible.

1"The writer has prepared an Appendix of the 154 rules, showing the mean jud-oment
scores of the four groups and the statistical significance of the scores of each of the
other three groups as compared with the scores of the Evidence Experts.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
This is quite sound psychologically. Interestingly enough, the highest rating
on this rule is by the Psychologists, the difference between their ratings and
those of the Evidence Experts being of some statistical significance.
20

In no case is it essential that a person's motive for an act shall
be ascertained or evidenced; but
the apparent absence of the specific appropriate motive may be
treated as evidence to negative the doing of the act.

Psychologically, this seemed to the writer to be an unsound rule. It is certainly considered questionable not only by the Psychologists but also by the
Practicing Lawyers, and in both instances (as compared with the judgments
of the Evidence Experts) probably because of non-chance factors.
29

On an issue involving parentage, the corporal features of the
child, if sufficiently developed, are evidence.

The writer believed this rule was unsound. This view is most certainly borne
out by the Psychologists, their judgments differing from those of the Evidence
Experts because of other than chance factors. Also, the Law Professors and
the Practicing Lawyers, probably because of non-chance factors as compared with the Evidence Experts, consider the rule of doubtful value.
30
On an issue involving a person's descent from a particular racestock or nationality, the corporal features of the person are evidence.
Again, the writer believed this unsound. His belief is corroborated by the
Psychologists, the difference between their judgments and those of the Evidence Experts being of genuine statistical significance.
32

Where, in a trial involving homicide or other violence, and on an
issue of self-defence, the deceased's character for violence or turbulence or the opposite is admissible..., particular instances of his
conduct exhibiting this trait are not admissible to evidence such
character.

The writer judged this rule as unsound. So do the Psychologists (the critical
ratio being fairly high as compared with the Evidence Experts). The rule
also receives low ratings by the Law Professors and the Evidence Experts.
34

In an issue involving the competence of an employee, particular
instances of conduct exhibiting such competence or the opposite are
admissible.

This seems psychologically sound; and the rule is judged sound both by the
Psychologists and by the Law Professors, their judgments as compared with
those of the Evidence Experts being statistically significant.
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37

The presence of insanity in members of the person's family indicating an ancestral stock from whom it might be inherited is admissible, provided there is other evidence ... of its existence in the
person in question.

Apparently the Psychologists are not quite so sure of the "goodness" of this
rule as are the other three groups, although none of the other groups gives
the rule an extremely high rating.
40

Intent is a person's state of mind, at the time of doing an act,
with reference to his volition of the act and its external consequences. The intent may thus be evidenced circumstantially
(a) by his conduct or utterances,
(b) or, by his prior or subsequent state of mind.

The writer thought this rule was psychologically unsound. With a difference
in judgment as compared with the Evidence Experts due to other than chance
factors, the Psychologists do not give this rule a very high rating.
41

A person's knowledge, belief, or consciousness of a matter may
be evidenced circumstantially
(a) by external circumstances likely to produce such a state of
mind;
(b) or, by his conduct or utterances indicating it;
(c) or, by the prior or subsequent existence of such a state of
mind.

The writer also thought this rule was psychologically unsound. Again, with
a difference in judgment as compared with the Evidence Experts due to
other than chance factors, the Psychologists do not give this rule a very
high rating.
The possession of a document is evidence of the possessor's
45
knowledge of its contents.
The writer judged this rule as psychologically unsound. The only group to
give this rule a numerical rating higher than its mean score for the 154 rules
is the group of Practicing Lawyers. Both the Evidence Experts and the Law
Professors rate it lower than their respective means; and the Psychologists
(differing for statistically significant reasons from the Evidence Experts)
judge the rule as bad.
46

The conduct and utterances of an accused person, indicating circumstantially a consciousness of his innocence of the crime charged,
are not admissible in his favor.2° (For example, the accused's refusal to escape when it is in his power.)

nThe rule has been stated in the negative by the writer, in accordance with the
majority view.
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Both Wigmore and the present investigator believe this to be a bad rule, and
so apparently do all four of the experimental groups.
52

No person is disqualified as a witness by reason of insanity, imbecility, disease, intoxication, or any other form of mental derangement or defect, except insofar as his condition precludes substantially all trustworthiness in his powers of observation, recollection,
or narration, on the specific matter to be testified.

All the judges except the Evidence Experts question the advisability of this
rule, and the difference between the judgments of each group and those of
the Evidence Experts is of genuine statistical significance. All three of these
other groups rate the rule considerably below their mean judgments for the
entire 154 rules, the psychologists rating the rule particularly low.
54, 55, 56, and 57
These four rules have been discussed supra Sec. VIII.
61

A witness to sanity or the reverse is qualified who has had sufficient observation of the person to form a belief as to his mental
condition.

The writer judged this rule as psychologically unsound. So do the Psychologists judge it as unsound, the difference between their judgments and the
favorable judgments of the Evidence Experts being of real statistical significance. With non-chance factors apparently operating, the Law Professors
differ from the favorable judgments of the Evidence Experts. Also the
Practicing Lawyers give the rule a rating below the mean for their group.
75

The testimonial character of a witness, whether in general or
only for the particular trait of veracity, may not be evidenced by
the inference or opinion of a witness qualified by personal observation.

Both Wigmore and the writer believe this rule to be definitely bad. So do
the Evidence Experts, the Law Professors, and the Psychologists. The only
exception is the Practicing Lawyers who do, however, rate the rule somewhat
below the mean for their group.
78

The demeanor of the witness while testifying may furnish evidence as to his testimonial qualities.

The other three groups believe this to be a good rule, but the Psychologists
have little faith in it. The difference between their judgments and those of
the Evidence Experts is statistically significant.
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84

In a criminal trial, the accused, to rebut the inference that might
possibly be drawn from his supposed conduct in failing to deny or
otherwise, may not introduce his conduct and utterances, after the
act charged, tending to evidence his consciousness of innocence.

Neither Wigmore, the present investigator, nor any of the four groups has
very much faith in the soundness of this rule. The Psychologists give it the
poorest rating of all.
103

A child, deficient in knowledge when examined, may be instructed
so as to become capable.

Wigmore thinks this rule is bad, the writer thinks it bad, and the Psychologists think it bad. The remaining three groups give it a rather low rating.
Incidentally, the Psychologists differ in their judgments from the Evidence
Experts probably because of non-chance factors.
110

In a criminal or civil case involving a wrong by a man to a
woman's chastity, or analogous thereto, the complainant woman's
testimony alone, uncorroborated by other evidence, is not sufficient.

Although the other three groups do not judge this rule very favorably, the
Psychologists give it a very high rating. The difference between their views
and those of the Evidence Experts is statistically significant.
111

In patent causes, where a patent is disputed because of priority
of invention ("anticipation"), the claimant's testimony to priority
of conception and use is not sufficient without corroboration by other
evidence.

Again, although the other three groups do not rate this rule very high, the
Psychologists give it an extremely high rating; and again, the difference between their views and those of the Evidence Experts is statistically significant.
140

Where one party has so expressed himself that the reasonable
purport is a specific jural transaction, it has that jural effect, and
his actual intention not to have that jural effect is immaterial.

The Psychologists give this rule a poor rating, statistically significant from
the rating of the Evidence Experts. Even the other three groups, however,
in comparison with the means for each of these groups, do not give the rule
too favorable a judgment.
XI
The question is, to what extent should rules of evidence be continued in
use? The answer is, rules of evidence should be continued in use only to
the extent that particular rules are considered "good" by intelligent persons
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with special knowledge of the problems involved. Rules of evidence should
be rechecked empirically, and then be affirmed, modified, or discarded.
The method employed here is only one of many which could be used to
attack the problem. 21 Instead of a statistical approach, an experimental or
an observational approach could be devised which would also present answers
as to the value of certain questionable rules.21' The point is that a truly
empirical attack is needed.
We should be done with mere theorizing. Let us not follow the rules
blindly simply because they exist. Instead, let us examine each of the rules
empirically to determine which ones merit continuation. Let us behave as
'22
lawyers, and not merely as "lawmen.
Dean Wigmore has recently pointed out that "a heavy body of public
opinion" is accumulating which blindly aims to discard much or all of the
rules of evidence.2 He says: "There is a real danger here, which we ought
to appreciate. I, for one, am ready to affirm my entire conviction in the solid
merit of our system of evidence as a whole. We cannot afford to abandon
its fundamentals. But we must at least try to eliminate, as far as possible,
the many excrescences of sheer technicality which have grown up around it,
4
and which excite the criticism of the lay public and of other professions."2
In accordance with such a belief, Dean Wigmore has been chairman of a
Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence, composed of five
members (including three judges). This Committee has in turn worked with
an advisory committee of sixty-five practicing lawyers, judges, and professors
of Evidence, representing all states. The seventy lawyers made suggestions
as to topics, these were published and voted on by the entire group, and
thirty-two proposals were thus selected for intensive study. Of these thirtytwo proposals, fifteen were officially approved at the 1938 meeting of the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, and ten were recommended by the same bbdy for reference and further study.i This most
2
'An outstanding study of five proposed uniform statutes in Evidence was reported
by Morgan, Chafee, Gifford, Hinton, Hough, Johnston, Sunderland, and Wigmore in
THE LAW OF EvIDENCE: SOME PRoPosALs FOR ITS REFORM (1927).
GCf. Dashiell, Legal Rules of Evidence as a Neglected Experimental Field (1931)
28 PsycHoL. BULL. 576.
-Dean Wignore says: "What is needed is a body of expert trial practitioners (like
the British barristers), who shall be masters of the rules and shall thus ensure for the
rules that perfect working by which alone they can serve the ends of justice." WiGmoRE,
op. cit. supra note 6, at xii.
2Ouoted in Plan to Rid Evidence Rueles of Their Fleas (1938) 22 J. Am. JUD. Soc. 136.

2'Ibid.
See Reiort of the Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence in REPORTS
OF THE SEcTioN OF JuDicIAL ADMINISTRATION presented at the annual meetini

of the American Bar Association, Cleveland, Ohio, July 25-27, 1938, at 62; the list of

recommendations approved by the Section of Judicial Administration and by the House
of Delegates in Standards of Judicial Administration Adopted (1938) 22 J. AM. JD.
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certainly represents a noteworthy attempt to bring the law of Evidence into
line with what intelligent lawyers consider desirable. It represents another
type of empirical investigation in that it uses the method of referendum for
the legal profession as a whole.
Both that type of investigation and the kind of research carried out in
the present study represent a nearer approach to the determination of what
is desirable and what is undesirable in the law of Evidence than does mere
arm-chair philosophizing.2 6 The principal advantages of the present study lie
in the use of statistical methods, and in the collection of judgments of three
different types of lawyers, Evidence Experts, Law Professors (who do not
teach Evidence), and Practicing Lawyers, plus the judgments of Psychologists, representing a group of intelligent persons with a psychological background and non-legal training.
That there were differences in viewpoint as to the value of the present
method was indicated, however, in various letters of reply which accompanied the return of the sets of rules. The following statements, both made
by Deans of Law Schools, represent the extremes of opinion:
(1) "I must confess that I fail to see the value of the questions from
either a legal or psychological viewpoint ....

If I were to give voice to

what is actually in my mind, I would say, with all regard to your feeling, ... that there are two very useless professions; one the psychiatrist
and the other the psychologist, and I am in equally grave doubt as to
which is the worse."
(2) "I look forward with a great deal of interest to the publication
of your findings soon and hope that you will inform me where I may
find them."
Fortunately for the completion of the study, statements similar in tone
to quotation (1) above were extremely rare. The great majority from all
four groups of judges expressed views favorable to the study, as in
quotation (2).
Soc. 66, 68, and in A Comprehensive Program of Judicial Reform (1938) 24 A. B. A. J.
726; also Plan,to Rid Evidence Rules of Their Fleas, wupra note 23; also note, American
Law Institute Undertakes Code of Evidence (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 380.
'The only practical difficulty with either type of study is that there may be a disparity
between the rules of evidence as stated in the books and the rules of evidence as actually
applied in the court rooms. Thus, Professor McCormick says: "The lush exuberance of
doctrines which bloom in the digests and the six-volume treatises on evidence, and the
sharp quiddities of the class room, though they we&te fairly well known to the advocate
of a generation ago, are not familiar ground to the average successful trial lawyer of
today. To master these rules so that they could actually be used, to retain them, and
to keep abreast of their changing current, would be a mammoth task, and one which
as a practical man he believes is not worth the cost. Of what use.to learn Culbertson's
canons of bidding at bridge, unless your partner knows them also? For even the trial
judges today, with notable exceptions, have only a discreet bowing acquaintance with
the evidence, rules." McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence (1938) 24 A. B. A. J.
507, 508.
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SUMMARY
(1) In summary, it may be said that the present investigation represents
an empirical study, in the field of psychology and law, of certain rules of
evidence.
(2) One hundred and fifty-four rules of evidence were selected from
Wigmore's Code of Evidence as a sampling of all sorts of categories in the
law of Evidence, most of the rules chosen apparently being the law in the
majority of jurisdictions. Forty-three were selected because an evaluation
of them requires a psychological judgment. Forty-three (but not exactly the
same forty-three) of the 154 were considered to be of questionable value;
this judgment, however, needed to be checked empirically. Accordingly, the
154 rules were submitted to four different groups for their judgments: 34
Evidence Experts (professors of Evidence teaching in law schools which
belong to the Association of American Law Schools, who had taught Evidence
for over five years); 34 Law Professors who do not teach Evidence; 34
Practicing Lawyers; and 34 Psychologists.
(3) One of the most interesting results is the high degree of consistency
between the judgments of the members of any one group and other members
of the same group. Most people would probably suspect not only that the
four groups would differ widely in their opinions concerning rules of evidence, but that members of the same group would also differ considerably
in their ideas. Yet this study demonstrates that this is not true.
For example, there is a popular notion among non-lawyers that lawyers
cannot agree among themselves. However, the coefficients of correlation
indicate close agreement between the members of each of the three groups
of lawyers and the other members of the same group. Each group is in close
agreement among its own members. Also, statistical analysis of the judgments by the Evidence Experts on each of the rules confirms the idea that
the Evidence Experts agree remarkably well among themselves [cf. (8)
infra]. Contrary to "common sense" notions, lawyers agree with each other
to a surprising degree in the present case.
Similarly, there is a notion among non-psychologists that psychologists
never agree with each other. Yet, contrary to popular expectation, the amount
of agreement between the Psychologists is remarkably high, being equalled
only by the agreement of the Evidence Experts with each other. Here were
a group of Psychologists of diversified training and naive as to the law, and
yet approaching the same problems with a point of view which apparently
resulted in essentially similar judgments.
(4) There is also a remarkably high degree of consistency between the
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judgments of the Evidence Experts and of the Law Professors. The amount
of agreement between the Evidence Experts and the Practicing Lawyers,
and between the Law Professors and the Practicing Lawyers, is also fairly
high, certainly much higher than arm-chair philosophizing might lead one
to suppose.
The amount of agreement between the Psychologists and each of the three
groups of lawyers was also quite high. This is of particular interest because
this group, being without legal training, were probably making their judgments on a different basis from the three groups of lawyers. Here were
lawyers and psychologists concerned with the same problems, but with different types of training, and yet arriving at similar conclusions on a great
many of the individual rules.
(5) That the four different groups were not judging the rules on the
same basis is indicated by the critical ratios for the coefficients of correlation.
Since the differences in their judgments were very reliable statistically, probably because of the difference in the psychological "set" of each group, the
use of these four diverse groups in order to secure differences in points of
view certainly seems justified.
(6) All four groups tended to judge the rules of evidence fairly high.
Many judges, especially the Psychologists, even made comments about the
soundness of most of the rules.
(7) Critical ratios for the arithmetic mean of each of the other three
groups as compared with the arithmetic mean of the group of Evidence Experts show that the difference in the total judgments of the Evidence Experts
and of the Law Professors is not statistically significant, nor between the total
judgments of the Evidence Experts and of the Practicing Lawyers. However, the difference between the total judgments of the Evidence Experts
and of the Psychologists is of genuine statistical significance; the non-legal
training of the Psychologists probably accounts for this.
Coefficients of variability show that Practicing Lawyers as a group tended
to concentrate their numerical judgments at about the same level of "goodness"; Evidence Experts and Law Professors distributed their judgments a
bit more, and about equally to each other; and Psychologists were the most
variable of all. These results are what might be expected in terms of the
so-called "practical" views of practicing lawyers, the more "theoretical" views
of professors of Evidence and of other subjects, and the psychological views
of psychologists with no legal training. It should be understood, however,
that these results in no way suggest that the judgments of any one group
are superior to those of another; they simply give some idea of the relative
dispersion of the judgments of the four groups.
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(8) A statistical analysis of the judgments by the 34 Evidence Experts
on each of the 154 rules gives additional confirmation to the idea that the
Evidence Experts agreed remarkably well among themselves. The extremely
high coefficient of correlation for this group had already indicated a very
high degree of consistency in their judgments; this additional analysis of
every item reveals only slight differences of opinion which are not statistically
significant.
Such a finding seems extremely important because of the suspicion which
often attaches to "experts," the view often being that they cannot agree among
themselves. The results of this study suggest that on questions of Evidence,
the Evidence Experts (using the criteria of the present investigation) can:
be relied on to have a good deal of unanimity of opinion among themselves
as to what is desirable and what is undesirable in the field of Evidence.
(9) An item by item analysis shows the differences in judgment of the
four groups. Critical ratios for each of the 154 rules separately (comparing
the mean judgments of the Evidence Experts on each rule with those of
the Law Professors, with those of the Practicing Lawyers, and with those
of the Psychologists) indicate to what extent these differences in judgments
on each rule are of statistical significance. Rules 54 to 58 are discussed supra
Sec. IX to illustrate the method of interpretation of the results.
(10) Several of the 43 rules which required some type of psychological
judgment are discussed supra Sec. X. The desirability of securing the judgments of the Psychologists on legal matters of this sort is demonstrated.
(11) Rules of evidence should be continued in use only to the extent that
particular rules are considered "good" by intelligent persons with special
knowledge of the problems involved. The rules should be examined empirically, especially by Evidence Experts, to determine which ones should probably be continued in use. Particular rules should also be examined by experts
in other fields; e.g., those which involve matters of trial technique should be
examined by Practicing Lawyers, those which involve psychological matters
should be examined by Psychologists. The rules of evidence should accordingly be affirmed, modified, or discarded.

